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Introduction

The Emerging Salience of Geoengineering
Wil C. G. Bums and Andrew L. Strauss

What has become increas ingly clear over t·he last few years is that th e international
com muni ty is not even close to t<lckling t·he global warming problem in a way that
will avert prof~und climatic consequences. Paragraph 1 of the 2009 Copenhagen
Accord formally incorporates "th e scientific view that the increase in global temperature shou ld be be low two degrees Celsius.'" In fact, that scientific view is changing as
m ore and more cl imate researchers come to realize that a two degrees Celsius increase
over preindustrial levels threa tens serious disruptions of th e ea rth 's biosphere.
T he current inc rease in global temperatures of .8 degrees Celsius is already having a significa nt deleterious effec t. G laciers are m elting,' sea levels are rising,3 a
third of Arctic sea ice is disa ppearing in th e summer,4 th e oceans are 30 percent
more acidic,; and the average moisture cont·ent of th e earth's air has increased by 5
percen t, lead ing to more extreme weather. 6 Prominent NASA scientist Jim Hansen
ec hoed the views of many climatologists when he declared, "wa rming [of two
degrees Celsius] is a guarantee of global disasters."7

Copen hage n Accord, art. I, Dec. 18,2009, available at ht~) :llunfccc. int/lil es/m ee tin gs/co pI 5/a ppli ca
tion/pdf/copl5cphauv.pclf (last visited Aug. 7, 2012).
, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001' The Physical Science /3asis: Contribution of Working Croup I to the 1'(J!lrth
/\ssessl11ent Report of the Intergovern lllenl<Ji Panel Oil Clilllate Challge 109 (Z. Manning et <II. eds.,
2007).
1
Id. at III ; CLIMATE CHANGE & SEA LEVEL RISE: CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE OCEANS,
C limate Institute, ht~) :llwww.c lim a te.o rg/topics/se.l - l eve l/ind ex. html(l as t visited Aug. 7, 2012).
4
ARCTIC REPORT CARD: UPDATE FOR 20 11, TRACKING RECENT ENVIRONM ENTAL CHANGES, SEA ICE
(D. Perovich et al. eds., 2011), available at ht~ :llwww.arc ti c. n oaa.gov/reportca rd /sea_ i ce. html(las t
visited Aug. 7,2012).
ROYAL SOCIETY, OCEAN ACIDIFICATION DUE TO INCREASlNG ATMOSPHERIC CARBON DIOXIDE: POLI CY
DOCUMENT 12105 25-30 (J . Raven et al. eds., 2005), available at http://roY<l lsociety.o rg/uploadedFiles/
RoyaLSociety_Content/poli cy/p ub lic<l ti ons/z005/9634·tJClf (last visited Aug. 7, 2012).
6 CLI MATE CHANGE 2007, SUIJ((1 note 2, <It 105.
7
Interview by World Wa tch Institute with Jam es t-hillse n, 21 WORLD WATC H MAG. 6, Old y/Aug. 2008),
available at ht~ :llwww.lVo rld w<l tc h .o rg/no d e/5775.
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But even th e prospec ts of keeping global wa rming within th e two dcgrees thres hold
seem ex tremely unlikely from today's va ntage point. The best sc ientifi c estimates are
that we ca n coll ec tively release roughl y 565 more giga tons of ca rbon int·o th e atmosph ere by midcentury and stay within th e two degrees Celsius thres hold ; however
at current growth rates of approximately 3 percen t· per yea r (which show no signs of
aba ting) we are on track to cons iderably exceed t-ilat thres holcl B Despite consic1 erclbl e sc ientifi c consensus about th e dange rs we are fa cing, and a well-funded climate
change movement t'hat ha s ga lvani zed citi zens from aroundt'he world , on balance
th e politica l will to make the necessa ry effort to redu ce carbon emiss ions does not
exist. What is more , it does not seem likely to come about within t'he time fram e
necessary to stave off very serious consequences.
With thi s political rea lity in the foregro und , we asked eleven of th e wo rld 's most
prominent stud ents of climate change law and poli cy to contribute to this book on
"the deliberate large-sca le manipulation of th e planetary environment to counteract anthropogenic climate change,"9 commonly ca ll ed geoengineering or climate
modification. Alth ough th e prospect of globa l acto rs embarking upon major clilllate
modification projects in the hope of countering climat'e change terrifi es sO lll e and
excites others, few doubt th at it could well be in our collec t ive fut·ure. As long as
t'he threa t of climate change continues to grow and geoengin eering tec hn ologies
are within reach , th e t'antali zing hope of a geoengin eering "fi x" will only grow more
attracti ve to many.
Th is cons idera hon of la rge-sca Ie geoengineering projects ra ises many serious
legal, policy, and philosophi ca l issues that are explored in th e pages t'hat follow. We
did not intend thi s volume to be an advocacy book to eith er promote or disc redit
geoenginee ring as a response to climate change. Rath er, in t'he hopes of helping
inform t'he c1ebat'e that is emerging, we invited contributors with a wide range of
perspec tives. At th e most general level th e qu estions break down into two broad
categories: how do we dec ide and who decid es. [s a decision to elllbark upon a
lmge-sca le and potentiall y risky project t·o modify the global clilllate eve r justifi ed?
If so, in a wo rld that lacks a global legislature capable of making coll ective climate
modification dec isions, who should determine whether t·o authorize potentially ri sky
projects? To th e ex tent states or priva te actors und ertake such ventures without t'he
bless ings of th e intern ational community generally, what rights do those who oppose
such actions ha ve? Alth ough th e methodologi es used by our contributors are di ve rse,
and th ere is considerabl e overlap in th eir approaches, genera ll y spea king, t'he first
x P. Fri edlingstein, R.A. iloughton, C. Marh1l1e1 , J Hackler, T.A. Boelen, T.J. Conway, J.C . Ca naelcll,
M.R. Raupac h, P. Ciais & C. Le Quere, U{Jd(/le Oil C02 ";lIIis.,iol).', 3 NATURE GEOSC IENCE 811
(Dec. 2010).
<, The Roy" I Society, Ceoellgilleerillg Ihe C/im(/te: Sciellce, Covenulllce (/Il d Uncertainl ), (Se pt. 2009),
at II , ht~):l/roya l soci ety.org/Ceoe ll g in ee rillg-the-cli111atel (last visited on Mar. 28, 20 11 ).
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three contributors to this volume ground their chapters in ethics and philosophy
whereas the remaining contributors ground theirs in law and governance. We have,
therefore , chosen to organize the volume along those lines.
In Chapter 1, "Geoengineeringand Moral Schizophrenia : What Is the Question? ,"
Ste phen M. Garcliner contends that two questions are central to the eth ics of geoengineering. The justificatory question asks: "Under what future conditions might
geoengineering become justified?" The nature of the future conditions he considers include, for example, the nature ancl extent of the climate change threat to be
confronted, and other background global circumstances, including the existing
governance mechanisms, individual protections, and compensation provisions. The
contextual question ask: "What is the ethical context of the push toward geoengineering, and what are its implications?" Gardiner argues that early discussions
of geoengineering often marginalized both questions because participants in those
discussions tended to view their consideration as luxuries that we could not afford
given the emergency nature of the climate change problem. Gardiner concludes that
such emergency arguments are ethically shortsighted, and morally sch izophrenic .
In reaching this conclusion, Gardiner employs two abstract examples. Although
both are extreme and idealized, according to Gardiner even the imperfect analogies provide reasons for concern about our current predicament. Ethically serious
discussion of geoengineering shou ld confront eth ical problems, rather than hide
behind overly simplistic appeals to moral emergency. As Michael Stocker puts it in
his seminal discussion of moral schizophrenia, "to refuse to do so bespeaks a malady
of the spirit."
In Chapter 2 , "The Ethical Foundations of Climate Engineering," Clive Hamilton
argues that the idea that the planet's optimal temperature should be set through a
process of calculation reflects a particular conception of the world and the nature of
humans that emerged first with the Scientific Revolution and later Enlightenment
philosophy. This conception, according to Hamilton , holds that the human being
is a self-legislating sub jective entity, distinct from the rest of the world and guided
by its cognitive abilities. It is, says Hamilton, the basis of the technological thinking
now being applied in plans to engineer the climate. Hamilton suggests that solar
radiation management is the culmination of the transition to the mechanical conception of nature and the parallel emergence of ph ilosophies built on the idea of the
autonomous rational subject exercising control over an inert environment. These
conceptions, and the consequentialist ethics they gave rise to, are now challenged
by earth-system science itself. The earth under the Anthropocene is not mere putty
to be shaped at will by humans.
In Chapter 3, "The Psychological Costs of Geoengineering: Why It May Be Hard
to Accept even ifIt Works," Gareth Davies observes that debates about climate change
and geoengineering often revolve around "quantitative and conc rete cons iderations ,"
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such as economic and en vironm ental impacts. Such considerations, however, he
argues "are often quite di vorced from th eir rea l psyc hologica l imporlance for most
people, the fear, uncerta inty, and hope that th ey may inspire." Davies suggests that
an assessment of th e psyc hological "losses" associated with climate geoengin ee ring
may explain far more than economic , climatic, or material factors abo ut th e basis
of th e opposition to geoengin eering. The prim<uy l'11ree losses, Davies argue, are:
relative status, sec urity, and hope. Davies suggests I-hat many m cmbers of the environmentalmovement would suffe r a diminution of relati ve status if th eir m ora l and
political standing was und ercut by a solution that did not require fundamentally
transforming soc iety. In te rms of sec urily, geoengineering could und e rmin e sec uri ty
by offering only partial soluti ons "be tween mitigation a nd c limate management"
ancl "entail a probabilisl'ic approach to policy" that many wou ld find disconcerting. Fina lly, if geoenginee ring were to remove climate change as a threat, Davies
conl'ends that th e hope of deep ecologists that climate c hange would justify their
fundamental tenets wou ld be dashed.
In Chapter 4, "Geoeng in eering and Cl imate Managemenl: From Ma rginali ty
to Inevitabilily," Jay Michaelson makes the case that geoengineering, or climate
management as he calls it, "is I·he only approach to climate change that can act as
a compromise be tween libera ls and libertarians, greens and browns." It appea ls to
conservatives, he argues, beca use it protects economic inte rests, is in line with m arket ideology, uses tec hnology rath er than restraints on be havior, and avoids government regulation. He argues that to liberals, its appeal may not be intuiti ve, but tha t
their acceptance of it is necessa ry if they wish to actuall y make progress on climale
change, given real world political realities. Michaelson acknowledges that liberals have legitimate concerns about embarking on climate managem ent initiatives.
Those concerns range from equitable considerations, including the giving of "free
passes" to polluters, to th e potential risks and costs of projects, including catac lysmi c
warm ing in th e case of cessation of solar radiation management and the dangers that
rogue actors could pose. He argues, however, that th ese concerns are answerable in
every case.
In C hapter 5, "Climate Change and the Anthropocene Era," Lee Lime advocates assess ing the judi ciousness of climate geoengineering throug h the lens of a
Weberian "ethic of responsibility." He focuses "on knowing the like ly consequences
of our policy c hoices and accepl'ing responsibility for th em rath er than on more
abstract ethical precepts." Lane argues that greenhouse gas control measures would
yield minimal nel' financial gains and impose ex trem ely hig h costs; moreover, such
controls cou ld upset existing trad e regimes, depress agricultura l production , and roil
bil ateral relationships be lween major sta tes, including th e Unit'ed Sta tes and C hina.
Lane also argues that I·here are many imposing politica l barri e rs to effec bve impl emenhltion of inl'ernational greenh ouse gas controls. T he case for geoengineering
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lies in the fact that the potential benefits are "very large compa red to the estimated
costs of develop ing and deploying it." Although Lane acknowledges risk associated
with deployment, including potential shutdown of monsoons in Asia, he argues that
the benefi ts would still substantially outweigh such costs, espec ially if such costs are
weighed aga inst the impacts of climate change under a business-as-usual scenari o.
Finall y, Lane outlines a way forward for developing a regime to govern climate
geoengineering, suggesting th at regime structure will be dependent "on both the
distribution of relative power as well as the n eed to hold down the transaction costs
of managing the ystem ."
In C hapter 6, "Political Legitimacy in Decisions about Experiments in Solar
Radiation Management," David Morrow, Robert Kopp, and Michael Oppenheimer
maintain that making good policy dec isions about solar radiation managem ent
(SRM) requ ires a better understanding than we currently have of the effectiveness
and side effects of various SRM technologies. The authors argue, however, that gaining suc h understanding would require multiyear global trial s. Observing that such
trials would be ethically problematic beca use they would expose pe rsons, animals,
and ecosystems to serious risks, the authors go on to explore under what conditions
suc h trials would be ethicall y acceptable . They conclude that such acceptability
depends upon approval of the trials by an appropriate international body (i. e., one
with the political legi timacy to authorize the trial). The authors endorse Buchanan
and Keohane's "Complex Standard" for global political legitimacy: a global politica l institution is legitimate if it enjoys widespread support from de mocratic tates;
meets certain substantive conditions, such as avoidance of seriou s injustices and
the production of better outcomes than feas ible alterna tive institutions; and has
certain epistemic virtues, such as transparency and accountability. Morrow, Kopp
and Oppenheimer survey several global institutions as poss ibl e analogs for an SRM
governan ce institution , including those for governing nucl ea r weapons and for managing the Antarctic environment.
In C hapter 7, "Geoengineering and the Myth of Unilateralism: Pressures and
Prospect·s for International Cooperation," Josh ua Horton addresses one of the primary concerns of geoengineering opponents (as well as som e proponents): th e
specter of unilateral deployment. Horton argues that unilateral deploym ent is
unlikely for severa l reasons. To begin with, a state th at c hooses to unilaterally deploy
a geoengineering option would fac e the possibility of deploym ent of th e same or
othe r geoengineering options by other states, potentially impairing the effecti veness
of this approach . This would , Horton argues, necessitate coordination of deployment with other actors. Moreover, in the case of SRM , th e so-called termination
problem (the potential for a huge spike in warming should solar de Aection once
embarked upon be terminated ; see Burns, C hapter 9, infra) would encourage sta tes
reluctant to make an indefinite commitmen t on their own to coordinate their efforts
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int-ernati onally. Finally, Horton contends that the ava ilability of countermeasures
"would serve as perhaps the most pot-ent check on unilateral deployment of geoengineering tec hnologies such as stratospheri c aerosol injections." Horton also maintains that multilateral ism in geoengineering research and potential deployment can
be fostered by a portfolio of tactics known as "international management theory."
In Chapter 8, "International Legal Regimes and Principles Relevant to
Geoengin eering," Albert Lin assesses the potential role of international law in
governing potential resea rch and development and deployment of geoengineering options. Although concluding that no international agreement directly regulat-es geoengineering, Lin argues that a number of relevant treaties and principles
of intern ational law may playa role in geoengineering governance. Lin init ially
di sc usses a seri es of trea ties that may extend to geoengineering options in a general sense, including th e Un ited Nations Framewo rk Convention on C limate
Change, the Convention on th e Proh ibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use
of Environmental Modification Tec hniques, and the Convention on Biological
Diversity. Lin th en turns to "media-specific" treaties that may apply only to particular types of geoengineering projects, such as the London Convention/London
Protocol, an d the Law of the Sea Convention (ocean iron ferti li zation (OIF)); t-h e
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Ai r Pollution; the Montreal Prot-ocol
(SRM options injec ting particles into the atmosphere), and the Outer Space Treaty
(space-based options) . Finally, Lin suggests that th ere are several international norms
that might be appos ite, including norms calling for transboundary environmental
impact assessment, and the prohibition on inAicting transboundary harm, as well as
norms with less certain applica tion , including the preca utionary principle and the
principle of in tergenera t-ional equity.
In C hapter 9, "Climate Geoengineering: Solar Radiation Management and its
Implications for lntergenerational Equity," this book's coeditor, William Burns, examines th e extent to which th e emerging global norms requ iring that our presen t-day
ac tions take into account intergenerational equity legally constrain SRM geoengineering options. Burns contends that ceasing the use of SRM tec hnologies wou ld
pose the threat of a "termination effect," a huge multi-decadal pulse of warming
that- could overwhelm many ecosystems and human institutions. Moreover, some
SRM approach es could delay replenishm ent of the stratospheric ozone layer by as
much as seventy years. Such long-term deleterious consequences, th e author argu es,
would violate the principle of intergenerational equity by potentially denying future
generations an environment of commensurate quali ty to that we curren tly enj oy
beca use of either tec hnological failure or societal choice. Moreover, the threat of
a termination effect might compel future generati ons to con tinue the use of SRM
technologies, even if th ey deemed th ese technologies to be Illorally unacceptable
beca use of th e collateral effec ts. T hi s wo uld violate the intergenerational principle
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of conservation of opti ons, The chapter concludes th at' viable options ex ist to reduce
greenhouse gas emiss ions, whi ch wo uld preclude th e need to threaten t'he interests
of future genera tions,
In C hapter 10 "Ocean Iron Fertilization: Science, Law, and Uncertainty," Randall
Abate adds hi s vo ice to the disc uss ion of OfF'. Howeve r, in contrast to Chapter ll , the
author exp resses consid erabl e skepti cism about, th e potential effec tiveness of OIF's
ability enhan ce th e oceanic sink for ca rbon dioxide through th e add ition of iron to
stimulate phyt'Oplankton growth , as well as our ca pability of meeting th e substantia l
monitoring and verificabon chal lenges, In addition to exa mining th e role that existing internati onal reg im es cou ld play in th e regulation ofOlF, Abate addresses potentiall y applicable dom es hc laws in th e United States (i, e" th e Marine Protection,
Research and Sanctuaries Ac t and t'he Na tional Environmental Policy Ac t) , The
chapter co nclud es with detail ed recomm endati ons for establishing "an effective
international law framework to regulat'e OW," Abate outlin es two broad options in
thi s contex t. The first is th e esta blishm ent' of an independ ent regime to address
geoengin eer ing, Such a regime could be pattern ed on the UN Environmental
Modification Conventi on, Alt ernatively, geoenginee ring resea rch in particular
could be regulated under a new internat'ionall"!'ea ty regim e, or a less-formal international resea rch consorl'ia, A second option would be to harmoni ze ex isting treaties,
with th e Internabonal Maritime Orga ni za ti on serving as th e implementing boely
given its oversight of several relevant regim es, in cluding t'he London Convention
and th e London Protocol. At th e domestic level in th e United States, Abate also
suggests coordination of federal responses, including t'he possibility of establishing
a working group,
In Chapter ll , "Ocean Iron Fertilizal'ion: Time to Lift t'he Research Taboo,"
Kirsten G li ssow, Andreas Oschlies, Alexa nd er Proelss, KatTin Rehdanz, and Wi lfri ed
Rickels make th e case for pursuing research of OIF, Although concluding that OIF
ma y have th e potential to sequester comparab le amounts of carbon dioxid e as forest sequestTation tec hniques, Hl e auth ors ac knowl edge substantia l uncertainti es
that necessitate furth er research, The remainder of t'he chapter is devoted to legal
issues related to potential deployment of an OIF approach, The authors set forth
a framework that' could integra te O IF int'O th e Clean Development Mechanism
of th e Kyo to Prot'ocol and includ e a disc uss ion of meth ods to account for pennanence and leakage, The chapter exa min es t'he applicability of international treaty
regim es to OIF, including the United Nations Convention for th e Law of the Sea,
th e Conventi on on Biological Diversity, and t-he London Convention and London
Protocol. The authors conclude that th e application of t'he preca utionary principle,
often invoked by those who oppose climate geoengineering beca use of their potential negati ve impac ts could cut- in fa vo r of 0 1F deployment given the t'hrea t posed
by unchecked climate change,
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In C hapter 12, "Remak ing th e World 1'0 Save It: App lying U.S. Environm enta l
Laws to Climate Engineering Projec ts," Tracy Hester exa min es th e potential applicabil ity of U.S. environmental laws to climate geoengineering re earch. Pertinen t
statutes cited by the auth or include th e Na tional Weather Modifi cation Policy
Act of 1972, th e Clean Air Act, th e Clean Water Act, th e Endangered Species
Act, the Marine Prot'ection, th e Research and Sanct'ua ries Ac t, and th e NaH onal
Environmental Policy Ac t. T he chapter also exa mines t'l1 e pot'ential fo r judicial
revi ew of geoengincering via comm on law nuisance claims. Hcster conclud cs by
noting that the federa l governm ent may need to begin draftin g stra tegies and establishing stan dard s for approval or rejection of projec ts, and t'hat spec ifi c agencies may
wish to explore options to stop pro jects that pose cxcessive dangers or evo ke strong
publi c reac tions.

